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ABSTRACT Secure electronic identification (eID) is one of the key enablers of data protection, privacy,
and the prevention of online fraud. However, until now, the lack of common legal basis prevented European
Member States from recognizing and accepting eIDs issued in the other Member States. The electronic
identification and trust services (eIDAS) regulation provides a solution to these issues by ensuring the
cross-border mutual recognition of eIDs. FIWARE is a European initiative that provides a rather simple yet
powerful set of application programming interfaces (APIs) that ease the development of smart applications in
multiple vertical sectors and oriented to the future internet. In this paper, we propose a model that enables the
connection of FIWARE OAuth 2.0-based services with the eID authentication provided by eIDAS reference.
Thanks to this model, services already connected with an OAuth 2.0 identity provider can be automatically
connected with eIDAS nodes for providing eID authentication to European citizens. For validating the
proposed model, we have deployed an instance of the FIWARE identity manager connected to the Spanish
eIDAS node. Then, we have registered two services, a private videoconferencing system, and a public smart
city deployment, and extended their functionalities for enriching the user experience leveraging the eID
authentication. We have evaluated the integration of both services in the eIDAS network with real users
from seven different countries. We conclude that the proposed model facilitates the integration of generic
and FIWARE-based OAuth 2.0 services to the eIDAS infrastructure, making the connection transparent for
developers.
INDEX TERMS Access Control, eIDAS, electronic identification, identity, FIWARE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure electronic identification (eID) is one of the key
enablers of data protection, privacy and the prevention of
online fraud, especially in new areas of application, like
Smart Cities, where incorporating real identities into trustable
infrastructures has a huge potential.
eID can guarantee the unambiguous identification of a
person and make it possible to get the service delivered to
the person who is really entitled to it. However, until now,
the lack of common legal basis prevented European Member
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Ranjan Bose.
States from recognizing and accepting eIDs issued in other
Member States. Hence, this insufficient cross-border interop-
erability of national eIDs has prevented, until now, citizens
and businesses from benefitting fully from the digital single
market.
The Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS)
Regulation1 provides a solution to these issues by ensur-
ing the cross-border mutual recognition of eIDs. Technical
specifications and reference implementations of the inter-
operability nodes for the eID mechanisms were published
1eIDAS Regulation: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
trust-services-and-eid
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as open source on 26 November 2015 for the technological
infrastructure under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)
program.2
The ultimate goal of this initiative is to offer the possibility
to EU citizens to use their national eID in other EU countries
when accessing public and private services online. As stated
in the eIDAS regulation, the mandatory mutual recognition
of electronic identities in the whole EU is applied from
September 2018.
In terms of privacy, eIDAS complies with the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)3
recommendations, which defines a framework to improve
privacy protection management and interoperability between
OECD members [1]. Specifically, eIDAS regulation follows
theOECDprivacy principles of user data collection limitation
and data quality, ensuring user data sovereignty.
In parallel, FIWARE Community4 has emerged as an inde-
pendent open community whose members are committed
to materialise the FIWARE mission, that is: to build an
open sustainable ecosystem around public, royalty-free and
implementation-driven software platform standards that will
ease the development of new Smart Applications in multiple
sectors.
To achieve this mission, the FIWARE platform provides a
rather simple yet powerful set of APIs (Application Program-
ming Interfaces) that ease the development of Smart Appli-
cations in multiple vertical sectors and oriented to the Future
Internet. The specifications of these APIs are public and
royalty-free. Besides, an open source reference implemen-
tation of each of the FIWARE components (named Generic
Enablers, GEs) is publicly available so that multiple FIWARE
providers can emerge faster in the market with a low-cost
proposition.
In this scope, FIWARE Security Framework [2], [3] offers
a set of components that provide Identity and Access Control
to the services and applications ecosystems developed and
designed using the FIWARE APIs and components. Thus,
every service developed in FIWARE platform, offers to its
users the possibility to authenticate and secure their APIs
exploiting the FIWARE Identity component.
Specifically, FIWARE Security framework offers an
OAuth 2.0-based mechanism for external applications regis-
tration. On the other hand, to manage access control FIWARE
Security GEs are compatible with a basic Role-based access
control (RBAC) internal mechanism and with an advanced
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) mechanism based
on XACML 3.0 [4].
OAuth 2.0 is themost extended standard for providing third
party delegated authentication in the applications and services
in the Internet [5]–[7]. Good examples of identity providers




4FIWARE: The open source platform for our smart digital future,
https://www.fiware.org/
In this paper we propose a model that enables the connec-
tion of OAuth 2.0-based services with the SAML 2.0-based
eID authentication provided by eIDAS reference. Thanks to
this model, services already connected with an OAuth 2.0
identity provider can be automatically connected with eIDAS
nodes for providing eID authentication to European citizens.
For illustrating the implementation of the model we have
integrated it with FIWARE Security GEs. Thus, these soft-
ware components are connected with the CEF eID building
Block to allow CEF eID transnational authentication of EU
citizens by means of their national eID in FIWARE-based
OAuth 2.0 authentication domains.
After the integration of FIWARE Identity Management
and Access Control GEs with the CEF eID Building Block,
every FIWARE ecosystem service can be securely accessed
by Member States citizens. Furthermore, as stated before,
FIWARE provides a Security Framework to enable service
and applications development with OAuth 2.0-based authen-
tication. Thus, every new service designed and deployed
according FIWARE security basis, would be also accessible
by European citizens using their eID.
For validating the proposed model we have deployed an
instance of the FIWARE Identity Manager connected to the
Spanish eIDAS node. Then, we have registered two services
and extended their functionalities for enriching the user expe-
rience thanks to eID authentication. The first one is a private
service for providing multi-user video conferencing rooms.
The second one is a public smart city service that offers
citizens several facilities exploiting the information provided
by sensors deployed in Santander city. We have evaluated the
integration of both services with the eID authentication with
real users from seven different Member States.
The document is structured as follows. In Section II we
provide an overview of available related works in the state
of the art. In Section III we describe the necessary FIWARE
and eIDAS background to understand the rest of the paper.
Then, Section IV presents the proposed model and the spe-
cific implementation we have done in FIWARE. Section V
introduces the two use cases for validating the solution,
their deployments and the received input from users. Finally,
Section VI concludes the work and opens future lines of
research.
II. RELATED WORK
Over past decades the European Union has realized the
importance of implementing a global infrastructure for elec-
tronic identification of citizens in multiple sectors such
as eHealth or eBanking. The regulation of eIDAS could
be considered as the heir of another European approach
called STORK (Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed).
The STORK project deployed an interoperability platform to
allow cross-border authentication to Member States citizens
by using their eID. Works [8]–[10] show a description of
the whole architecture of STORK and provide important
insights into themain goals in concern of security and identity
management when deploying this kind of architectures.
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Authors of [8] organize identity management models
into four categories situating STORK model (and conse-
quently eIDAS) as a distributed and federated SAML-based
approach. On the other hand, they elaborate on how national
regulations imposition for explicit consent of users over their
data could compromise user experience. However, this kind
of issues are related with specific legal regulations that cannot
be solved from a technical point of view.
Besides, [11] identifies key privacy and security as the
main challenges to be addressed by STORK providing a
number of main decisions adopted by the project. Among
others, it stresses the importance of user-centric identity man-
agement in terms of user data control and the definition of
authorization policies to protect the confidentiality of users.
eIDAS was conceived as an evolution of STORK that aims to
solve its main issues.
For supporting the migration to eIDAS, old STORK nodes
could be connected to the new eIDAS ones in order to allow
cross-border authentication between member states that only
support one of the two standards. However, as STORK does
not support ciphered connections between peers, it is nec-
essary to encrypt the authentication requests to ensure the
confidentiality of user data in the new eIDAS model [12].
Moreover, when talking about interoperability between
identity management models, it is crucial to non-
compromising the privacy-preserving. Authors of [13]
propose a complex model that enables federation between
identity providers avoiding the definition of a common set of
attributes. On the other hand, some studies [14], [15] have
stressed the importance of privacy and interoperability in
the Cloud Computing context. Non-transparency due to the
location of sensitive data storage makes it difficult to comply
with the privacy laws of each country and to exchange these
data with organizations and services.
Regarding the connection of service providers to the
eIDAS nodes, each Member State has to decide the proto-
col to be used as the connector module is specific of each
implementation. As explained by authors of [16] and [17],
SAML 2.0 is the most extended protocol among Member
States. However, as they also explain, this standard presents
several limitations and hinders the integration of service
providers.
In this scope, the Innovation and Networks Executive
Agency (INEA) of the European Commission through its
CEF programme is promoting initiatives that facilitate the
integration of public and private service providers in the
eIDAS infrastructure. Several works have analyzed the issue
and proposed solutions to simplify the integration for appli-
cation developers.
Authors of [18] adopt a context and process analysis
framework to address the question of whether the eIDAS
complements or challenges the national e-government ini-
tiatives, specifically the Estonia’s e-residency project. They
conclude that the Member States have to contribute to the fast
implementation of the eIDAS. In their opinion this will be
the most effective measure for achieving cross-border use of
e-services.
On the other hand, authors of [19] discuss whether and
how two approaches can be combined in order to provide
services for electronic identification and authentication of
entities. They highlight the creation, verification, validation
and preservation of electronic signatures as well as the reg-
istered delivery of documents in an efficient manner using
cloud computing techniques.
Finally authors of [20] point out that the inclusion of
something-you-have authentication factor such as the mobile
devices must be also taken into account to improve the inte-
gration of services. They also make an analysis on how the
technologies and standards used for connecting services can
definitely decide the future of the eIDAS vision.
In this sense, nowadays the de facto standard for third
party delegated authentication in Internet is OAuth 2.0
[21]–[24], used by well-known identity providers like Google
[23] or Twitter [25]. OAuth 2.0 enables a third-party appli-
cation to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either
on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval
interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP ser-
vice, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain
access on its own behalf.
Comparing OAuth 2.0 to SAML 2.0, [26] enumerates the
differences between the two protocols and explains possible
vulnerabilities they have. It points out that OAuth 2.0 is
lighter and more scalable than SAML and that it could be
easier integrated in services and platforms in the Internet.
Moreover, they explain how from architectural design and
security perspective it fits better with the most relevant Fed-
erated Identity Management (FIdM) approaches.
FIdM has a lot of challenges that have to be addressed [27]
but it definitively improves the user experience and usability
of services, specially from the business perspective [28].
Regarding the possible security vulnerabilities, some
works have proposed fixes to security [29]–[31] or perfor-
mance [6] issues found in the OAuth 2.0 protocol. However,
some of them are related with a non fully implementation of
the standard [32], [33].
We can conclude that OAuth 2.0 protocol is definitively
a good solution for providing delegated authentication to
third party applications and services in the Internet. In our
proposal, we present a model to offer a single entry point for
registering services based on OAuth 2.0, making the details
about the eIDAS nodes specific protocols transparent for the
service providers.
III. FIWARE IDENTITY AND eIDAS BASIS
The CEF eID building block is a set of services (including
software, documentation, training and support) provided by
the European Commission and endorsed by the Member
States, which helps public administrations and private service
providers to extend the use of their online services to citizens
from other European countries. This is accomplished through
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FIGURE 1. eIDAS basic architecture.
the mutual recognition of national eID schemes (including
smartcards, mobile and digital certificates), allowing citizens
of one European country to use their national eIDs to securely
access online services provided in other European countries.
The mutual recognition of eID schemes across Europe is
mandated by the eIDAS Regulation.
In turn, the eIDAS Regulation states that all online public
services requiring electronic identification assurance corre-
sponding to a level of ’substantial’ or ’high’ must be able
to accept the notified eID schemes of other EU countries.
Public administrations offering online services that match
these requirements are therefore obliged to comply. On the
other hand, the specification is based on SAML 2.0 standard,
so the integration is also open to private services that desire
to offer their users the possibility of logging in by their eID.
This could add an extra security level in some services that
need to know exactly the identity of their users.
FIGURE 2. FIWARE IAM Architecture.
From a technical point of view, and supported by the
deployed eIDAS Network, services deployed in a specific
Member State can log in users of other Member States by
means of their eID. As illustrated in Figure 1, a Service
deployed in Member State 1 is connected to the eIDAS node
of the same Member State. When a User of a different Mem-
ber State tries to authenticate at that Service, the eIDAS node
delegates the authentication request to the eIDAS node of the
user’s Member State. The protocol used by eIDAS reference
for delegating the authentication is SAML 2.0 [34]. After
a successful authentication, the Service receives a SAML
Response containing the attributes of the user.
The objective of this work is to provide FIWARE Generic
Enablers users the possibility of authenticating in the ser-
vices provided by them using their national electronic
identification. Currently, the FIWARE Identity Framework
[3], [35] provides authentication to users by means of
a username/password mechanism based on OAuth 2.0
standard [36].
Thanks to OAuth 2.0, users registered in a unique Iden-
tity Provider (IdP) can authenticate in external applications
delegating the authorization to the IdP. Figure 2 shows how
an external application can create a token (OAuth 2.0 access
token) that represents the user in terms of authorization.
For creating this token any of the grants defined by the
protocol can be used. The one that is relevant for eIDAS
integration is the Authorization Code Grant. Using this grant
and in authentication time, users are redirected to the IdP
user interface where they securely enter their credentials.
Once correctly authenticated, the IdP redirects the users to the
application including an authorization code that they use to
create the token. Once the token is created, it represents each
user in terms of authorization and the application can access
the public user information stored in the Identity Provider.
Furthermore, using the access token, the service can access
other services andGEs ensuring that the resources exposed by
them are accessed in a secure way. For achieving this, every
request sent to a specific service is intercepted by a Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) that checks the user grants to access
the resource. Figure 3 shows the rest of components avail-
able in the Identity and Access Control Management (IAM)
infrastructure.
The Policy Administration Point (PAP) and the Policy
Decision Point (PDP), together with the set of PEPs included
in each Service, compose the widely-known Access Control
architecture [37]. The PAP stores the defined access control
policies in the Policies DB, where PDP checks them at deci-
sion time.
Figure 4 shows the flow for creating a token and using
it to access a protected resource in a service. Once a user
is registered in the IdP, it can create an OAuth 2.0 access
token for accessing data in the Service backend. In OAuth
2.0 terminology that means creating a token in the scope
of a consumer. This token represents the user in the system
and has to be included in every request sent to the backend.
As outlined before, these requests are intercepted by the PEP,
that extracts the user’s access token and validates it with the
IdP. This validation can be performed using three levels of
security:
1) Authentication: Using this level of security, the PEP
just checks if the user has been correctly authenticated
against the IdP. Thus, at this level, every user with an
active account would be able to access the protected
data. The check is performed by sending a validation
request to the IdP.
2) Basic authorization: In this case, the PEP also checks
if the user has the required permissions to perform the
corresponding action (defined by an HTTP verb) in
the corresponding resource (defined by an HTTP path).
After the first check with the IdP, the PEP obtains the
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FIGURE 3. FIWARE IAM Architecture for securing backends.
FIGURE 4. FIWARE Authorization flow.
roles (being a role a set of permissions) the user has
been assigned in the scope of the Service where the
token was created. Once roles have been retrieved,
the authorization check is sent to the PDP. PDP fetches
the policies associated with the user’s roles from the
Policies DB and decides whether or not access should
be granted based on them.
3) Advanced authorization: This is the most complex,
powerful case, because the authorization check is not
only based on the HTTP verb and path, but also
on other more advanced, customizable parameters,
such as the request body or headers. To perform the
check, a custom XACML policy request is sent to
the PDP.
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FIGURE 5. FIWARE IAM Architecture with connection to eIDAS.
IV. FIWARE IDENTITY FRAMEWORK
WITH SUPPORT TO eIDAS
Being explained how eIDAS reference and FIWARE Identity
work, in this Section we propose a solution for integrating
both technologies and providing a way of authenticating
European citizens in OAuth 2.0 services by means of their
eID. Our proposal is designed for being compatible with any
OAuth 2.0 server. In the following, we first explain how the
generic model works and then we describe its integration in
the specific case of FIWARE Identity Manager.
A. OAuth 2.0 - eIDAS MODEL
For supporting OAuth 2.0 authentication using the eID of cit-
izens, we propose a gateway between OAuth 2.0 and eIDAS
SAML 2.0. The main requirement of this gateway is to be
able to include eIDAS users in an OAuth 2.0 paradigm as
the one explained above. Coming back to Figure 3, when
the Service Application authenticates a user, it would be not
required that the user is already registered in the IdP. Users
with a valid eID could directly log in the service and obtain
an OAuth 2.0 access token that represents them in terms of
authorization.
Figure 5 shows the model we propose for supporting this
requirement. The Identity Provider is connected to the eIDAS
node of the country where it is deployed. Therefore, it can
send SAML 2.0 Authentication Requests to the eIDAS infras-
tructure on behalf of the service. Leveraging the eIDAS nodes
network, if the user that is trying to authenticate belongs to
a different country, the eIDAS nodes will interchange the
needed SAML requests between them.
For being able to authenticate a user using SAML, services
have to expose a SAML metadata file with some information
such as the public signing certificates that the eIDAS node
will validate before the authentication. In our proposal, when
a service is registered as an OAuth 2.0 consumer in the
Identity Provider, it creates the metadata file for the service
making this process transparent for developers. Thus, when a
developer registers a new OAuth 2.0 consumer in the Iden-
tity Provider, it generates the OAuth 2.0 client and secret
identifiers for creating access tokens and the SAMLmetadata
file. This file can be provided to the service or directly served
by the Identity Provider.
Figure 6 shows the requests flow interchanged between
the entities of the model once the service has been regis-
tered in the IdP and when a citizen authenticates there using
the eID.
1) The citizens try to log in the application and the appli-
cation redirects them to the Identity Provider using
OAuth 2.0 authentication flow. In this scenario the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant is used because
is the one that uses a client side user interface for
authentication.
2) The IdP authentication panel provides to the user
the possibility of logging in using the traditional
user/password credentials but also a new possibility of
using the eID. If the second option is selected the IdP
generates a SAML AuthnRequest and sends it to the
eIDAS node on behalf of the service.
3) When the eIDAS node receives the SAML request,
it checks if the user belongs to its country. If the answer
is yes, then it authenticates the user in the local national
Identity Provider where the citizen is registered. If the
citizen belongs to a different country, it delegates the
SAML request to the corresponding eIDAS node.
4) In both cases the final result is that the eIDAS node
returns a SAML Response to the Identity Provider with
the citizen’s profile. Of course, every sensitive data
interchanged between the eIDAS nodes and the IdPs
is encrypted and signed. The components use SAML
metadata files to retrieve the public certificates of each
node for managing encryption.
5) When the IdP receives and decrypts the SAML
Response, it extracts the user profile with the set of
attributes available in the citizen’s eID. Using this pro-
file the IdP checks if the user is already registered or if
a new account has to be created. Then, it performs a
mapping between the attributes available in the citi-
zen’s eIDAS profile and the ones available in the IdP.
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FIGURE 6. FIWARE Authorization flow with connection to eIDAS.
This process is explained with detail below. Finally,
the IdP generates an OAuth 2.0 authorization code in
the same way it does for a regular registered user.
6) With the authorization code the service can continue
the OAuth 2.0 flow to create the access token that
represents the user and that can be used for getting the
public information or authorizing it for accessing any
other service protected by a PEP.
With regard to attributes mapping, it is important to take
into account that the eIDAS profile could not provide a unique
identifier for citizens. For some Member States, the eIDAS
attribute PersonIdentifier can unequivocally identify a
citizen. However, this is not valid for all of them. For instance,
for German citizens, the provided PersonIdentifier attribute
changes every time the citizen receives a new eID token
(i.e. smart card). Likewise, Italian citizens can have multiple
PersonIdentifier, as the Italian national eID system supports
multiple IdPs, each providing a different PersonIdentifier for
the same citizen. Therefore, citizens have to be identified in
the IdP database using the same unique identifier than regular
users (typically a uuid, username, email or phone number).
Furthermore, the solution has to support the possibility of
associating several eIDAS PersonIdentifier to the same user
account. In our model, as we will justify later, this unique
identifier has to be remembered by users. Thus, a username,
an email or a phone number are better options than uuid’s.
Email addresses and phone numbers allow also the possi-
bility of getting confirmations from users, for instance for
creating an account or restoring passwords. For facilitating
the reading, in the following paragraphs we will generalize
this unique identifier as a username.
Taking this into account, when checking if the user that
is trying to log in is already registered in the IdP (step 5),
the following situations have to be considered.
• New user: when a new user tries to authenticate, the IdP
has to create a new account in the database using a user-
name. If the user consents the creation of the account,
the IdP has to associate the eIDAS profile to the new
account including the eIDAS PersonIdentifier attribute.
• User already registered in the IdP with user-
name/password: when the user trying to authenticate has
previously created an account in the IdP using username
and password, the eIDAS profile has to be associated to
this account. For achieving this, the user has to provide
the username of the existing account. Then, the IdP is
able to associate the PersonIdentifier and add the eIDAS
profile of the user to the existing account.
• User already registered in the IdP with an eIDAS identi-
fier: when a user trying to authenticate has previously
created an account in the IdP using an eIDAS profile
with the same PersonIdentifier, the IdP has to use the
same account for authenticating the user.
• User already registered in the IdP with a different eIDAS
identifier: when a user trying to authenticate has pre-
viously created an account in the IdP using an eIDAS
profile with a different PersonIdentifier, the new Per-
sonIdentifier has to be associated to this account. For
achieving this, the user has to provide the username of
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FIGURE 7. Workflow to map an eIDAS profile in the IdP.
TABLE 1. Mandatory attributes in eIDAS nodes.
the existing account. Then, the IdP is able to associate
the new PersonIdentifier to the existing account. In this
case, the user will have several PersonIdentifier associ-
ated with the account.
Figure 7 illustrates the process we propose for managing
each of these situations. When receiving the eIDAS profile
of the user that is trying to authenticate, the IdP searches
the PersonIdentifier extracted from the eIDAS profile in
the database. If a user with such identifier already exists,
the authentication process is complete. If it does not exist,
three possibilities may occur: 1) new user, 2) user already reg-
istered with username/password or 3) user already registered
with a different eIDAS PersonIdentifier. For checking this,
the IdP asks the user to provide a username and searches it in
the users database table. If the user already exists, the IdP asks
the user to confirm the association of the new eIDAS profile
to the existing account (for username/password accounts the
eIDAS profile is created and for accounts already associ-
ated to an eIDAS identifier the profile is updated with the
new PersonIdentifier). Asking the user’s confirmation for
creating or linking the account avoids identity theft and could
be performed by sending an email, a message, by signing a
consent, etc. If the provided username does not exist, the IdP
asks the user consent to create a new account and to associate
the eIDAS profile using the same procedure.
When the IdP creates a new account for the user, it has to
perform a mapping between the received attributes and the
ones defined in the IdP user schema. eIDAS specification
defines a set of attributes supported by the eIDAS nodes.
However, not all of them are mandatory so depending on the
specific eIDAS node they could be supported or not. Table 1
shows the mandatory attributes that every eIDAS node has to
support. This means that the IdP has to perform a mapping at
least between this set of attributes and the user schema of its
database.
In our model we propose to include an extra JSON
(JavaScript Object Notation) field in the user data schema for
storing the complete eIDAS profile of the user apart from the
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directly mapped attributes. For instance, it is very common
that a user has a field for the family name or the date of birth,
but not for the legal identifier. In this case the family name
and the date of birth retrieved from the eIDAS profile would
be directly stored in the IdP user profile, while the rest of
attributes would be stored in the extra field as a JSON object.
An example of this attributesmapping is illustrated in the next
subsection. The information about the eIDAS profile of the
user can be included as part of the user information provided
by the IdP when an application requests the user info using
an OAuth 2.0 token.
As for data protection, it is important that the Identity
Manager shows a consent informing users that their eID
profilewill be stored andmanaged by this new entity. Specific
data protection regulations of each Member State would be
applied for storing and using these data.
B. FIWARE IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the proposed model as an extension of
FIWARE Keyrock Generic Enabler. Keyrock is the Identity
Management GEri (Generic Enabler reference implementa-
tion) of FIWARE5 and it brings support to secure and pri-
vate OAuth 2.0-based authentication of users and devices,
user profile management, privacy-preserving disposition of
personal data, Single Sign-On (SSO) and Identity Federation
across multiple administration domains.
Keyrock has been developed by part of the authors of
this paper using Node.js and Express and makes use of
an SQL database for persistence. For implementing the
OAuth 2.0 - eIDAS model we have extended an existing
SAML 2.0 library6 for managing the authentication flow
between the IdP (Keyrock) and the eIDAS nodes. Moreover,
we have extended the OAuth 2.0 module of the components
for enabling the possibility of registering OAuth 2.0 con-
sumers as Service Providers in the eIDAS nodes. Thus, when
developers register a new consumer, they can choose the
option of enabling the eIDAS connection. After introducing
the service information in a web form, Keyrock generates and
serves a metadata file that will be checked by the eIDAS node
for getting the needed information (certificates, authentica-
tion callback URLs, etc).
Table 2 shows the relevant existing attributes in Keyrock’s
users schema. When Keyrock receives a SAML Response
from the eIDAS node with the eID profile of a citizen it
executes the process explained in the previous subsection to
check the nature of the user. In Keyrock, the email of the
citizens is used as unique identifier and unequivocally iden-
tifies them in the database. The email address is also used for
notifications and password reset purposes. Therefore, when
asking for the username in the specific step of Figure 7,
citizens have to provide their email address to check if their
account already exists in the database. To avoid identity theft,
they receive a confirmation email that has to be acknowledged
5https://fiware-idm.readthedocs.io
6https://www.npmjs.com/package/saml2-js
TABLE 2. Relevant attributes in Keyrock’s user profile.
before continuing the process. In case the eIDAS profile of a
citizen has to be created or updated in Keyrock, the following
actions are performed:
1) Attribute displayName is created as a concatenation
between the eIDAS attributes FirstName and Current-
FamilyName.
2) If available, the user photography is stored in image
attribute.
3) The eIDAS attribute PersonIdentifier is stored in a new
attribute named eidas_id. Citizens could have more
than one PersonIdentifier associated to their accounts
in case they are not unique in the specific Member
State.
4) The whole eIDAS profile is stored in the extra field as
a JSON object called eidas_profile
FIGURE 8. User profile returned by Keyrock.
As explained above, when an application requests the user
information using an OAuth 2.0 access token, the eIDAS
profile of the user is included in the response. Figure 8 shows
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and example of the JSON returned by Keyrock when an
application validates a user access token.
In the example, Keyrock has mapped the name of the user
and has included the received eIDAS profile in the extra field.
On the other hand, Keyrock returns the roles that the user has
been assigned in the scope of the application. These roles will
be used for enforcing the actions the user can perform in the
application.
V. USE CASES VALIDATION
We have deployed an instance of Keyrock Identity Manager
and registered two services to offer a testing environment to a
set of users from different European countries. These users
have tested the services and provided feedback answering
a survey. This section describes the details of the deployed
services and the results obtained from the evaluation.
A. IDENTITY MANAGER DEPLOYMENT
An instance of Keyrock Identity Manager component has
been deployed for performing the tests and for registering
the use cases service providers. This instance includes the
implementation of the OAuth 2.0 - eIDAS model proposed
in this paper.
The instance is publicly available7 and it has been deployed
in a virtual machine with the following characteristics:
• Operating system: Ubuntu 16.04
• RAM: 4GB
• VCPUs: 2 VCPU
• Disk: 40GB
The instance is connected to the official Spanish eIDAS
node.8 This node is only accessible by authorized service
providers so both use case pilots have been registered as
applications in Keyrock and also in the eIDAS node. After
registering the services, Keyrock serves the corresponding
metadata files so the eIDAS node can validate them and get
the public signing certificates.
B. MASHMETV VIDEOCONFERENCING SERVICE
The first service we have deployed is a private business video
conference platform, mashme.io. It is used in many differ-
ent verticals, like e-learning, consulting, e-health, etc. In all
those markets, users ask for an integrated experience with
their existing platforms, thus Single Sign On and centralized
identity is a must for the product.
Mashme.io is a Service-as-a-Service video collaboration
platformwhich is delivered via a web browser and requires no
plug-ins or application installation on the desktop of clients.
The software is based in HTML5 and WebRTC (Web Real
Time Communication) standards.
The aim of the product is to solve the problem of
fragmented tools and ephemeral discussions by offering a
complete real-time synchronized virtual classroom solution.
It is a modular platform that can be adapted to different
business needs.
7Keyrock Identity Manager instance: https://idm-cef-fiware.dit.upm.es
8Spanish eIDAS node: https://se-eidas.redsara.es/EidasNode
1) INTEGRATION WITH FIWARE-eIDAS SOLUTION
Taking advantage of the eID-FIWARE IdM Security frame-
work that offers an OAuth 2.0-based mechanism to external
applications, the first step is to register the mashme.io web
service9 as an application at the eID-FIWARE IdM. For this
purpose a web service URL is provided as well as a redirect
callback URL.
Registering as an external application at eID-FIWARE IdM
grants the mashme.io service OAuth 2.0 credentials that will
identify the service through the IdentityManager. Thus, being
connected with an OAuth 2.0 identity provider, thanks to the
eID-FIWARE IdM Security framework, the mashme.io ser-
vice will be automatically connected with the eIDAS nodes.
This will provide mashme.io an eID authentication option to
all our European users.
Due to the private nature of the service, it is necessary
to have an active mashme.io account for using the service.
Thus, in order to provide a testing environment on the
mashme.io service, we have created a special organization
called FIWARE, were all pilot users will belong to. This test
environment is the same as the one in production but with
the option to vinculate the mashme.io user account with the
eID-FIWARE IdM.
Then, mashme.io FIWARE users will have a link on their
mashme.io accounts to vinculate the account to eID-FIWARE
IdM. When this process starts, mashme.io, as an external
registered application using its OAuth 2.0 credentials, will
start the authentication process redirecting the user to the
FIWARE IdM. Then, through the gateway between OAuth
2.0 and eIDAS SAML 2.0 provided by the eID-FIWARE
IdM, users will be able to log in using their eID. Once the
flow between Keyrock and the eIDAS node is managed by
the gateway the user identity profile is retrieved from the
corresponding eIDAS node. Afterwards, the profile is used
by Keyrock to create a local copy of the user and to generate
an OAuth 2.0 authorization code.
With the authorization code the mashme.io service contin-
ues the OAuth 2.0 flow creating the access token that repre-
sents the user in the service and linking it to the mashme.io
account. Accordingly, themashme.io service is able to use the
information retrieved from the eIDAS profile of the citizen to
personalize the service.
2) eIDAS ATTRIBUTES USED
Mashme.io highlights the value of the data received from
eIDAS and FIWARE IdM to improve, detail and deepen
the use case. Below we show how to make use of the data
provided in our platform.
• Platform Integration: The following data of the eID pro-
file is stored in mashme.io: PersonIdentifier, Current-
FamilyName, FirstName and DateOfBirth
• User Profile: To enrich the user profile and provide
a more tailored experience, mashme.io makes use of
the following attributes: PersonIdentifier, FirstName
9Mashme.io service: https://app.mashme.io/login-fiware/login.html
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FIGURE 9. SmartSantander facility architecture.
and CurrentFamilyName (to create a mashme.io name
attribute). The attributes extracted from the Keyrock
profile are the email, the image (we will need to adapt
the image data to our avatar format) and the enabled
attribute (based on the enabled attribute we are be able
to activate the account at mashme.io or disable it with
our type flag).
• Customized Platform: Parsing eIDAS user profilePlace-
OfBirth and/or CurrentAddress attributes, we could get
the information regarding users native language and set
up the platform with its language if available.
• Billing Integration: In order to facilitate access and
commitment of our customers with our platform, the fol-
lowing attributes provided by eIDAS would be used
to register a mashme.io billing account profile speed-
ing up the set up and integration process: Legal-
Name, LegalPersonAddress, VATRegistrationNumber
and TaxReference.
C. SMARTSANTANDER SMART CITY
The second service we have deployed for validating our
proposal is based on the already existing Smart City infras-
tructure called SmartSantander. This facility is based on a real
IoT deployment in an urban setting. The core of the facility
is located in the city of Santander (Spain) and surroundings,
embracing IoT deployments in different key areas of the city
infrastructure, ranging from public transport, key logistics
facilities, public places and buildings, workplaces and res-
idential areas, thus creating the basis for the development
of a smart city [38]. This deployment exhibits the diversity,
dynamics and scale that are essential for the creation of digital
solutions that address urban challenges.
The deployed facility has a dual purpose. On the one hand,
it enables real-world experimentation on IoT related tech-
nologies (protocols, middleware, applications, etc.). On the
other hand, it supports the provision of smart city services
aimed at enhancing the quality of life in the city of Santander.
In this sense, as described in [39], a large number of added-
value services have been developed on top of the facility.
In Figure 9 we present a general representation of the main
components of SmartSantander facility. First, a set of com-
ponents enables the integration of IoT services and devices
(Service Proxy and Aggregator). Then, the data provided
by the integrated services is stored in the Smart Service
Cloud, which is the actual data repository. The stored data
can be afterwards consumed, leveraging different services,
through the security layer. As can be observed, the Smart-
Santander platform exposes an Authentication, Authoriza-
tion and Accounting (AAA) layer that permits controlling
the access to resources and ensuring secure interactions
with users and services. This layer belongs to the so-called
SmartSantander Secure Network Infrastructure, which imple-
ments various network security mechanisms to prevent
unauthorized access and attacks. Being part of a larger secu-
rity framework, the AAA layer is tightly coupled with the
components that provide support to SmartSantander ser-
vices. Therefore, in order to validate the integration with
FIWARE-eIDAS solution we have deployed a parallel testing
infrastructure that directly accesses to the core of SmartSan-
tander components.
1) INTEGRATION WITH FIWARE-eIDAS SOLUTION
As explained above, we have deployed a testing infrastructure
that gets direct access to the Smart Service Cloud component.
To validate the integration we have developed an IoT data
browsing web application, which is developed on top of the
FIWARE PEP Proxy in order to provide secure access to the
stored data.
FIGURE 10. SmartSantander Integration platform.
Figure 10 shows the software platform developed to carry
out the integration of the FIWARE-eIDAS solution into
SmartSantander framework. The SmartSantander web appli-
cation10 interacts with the deployed instance of Keyrock to
obtain an access token, which is afterwards used by FIWARE
PEP-Proxy as a key to open the access to Smart Service
Cloud.
10SmartSantander web application: https://eid-fiware.smartsantander.eu
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The web application is registered in eID-FIWARE IdM in
order to be recognized as an OAuth 2.0 client. First, it must be
specified the URLwhere the application will be executed and
the callback URL, which is the URL where the application
will be redirected to when the OAuth 2.0 process ends. As a
result, eID-FIWARE IdM provides the OAuth 2.0 credentials
of the application (client ID and client secret), which will be
used when the application requests access to SmartSantander
services.
Then, a FIWAREPEP Proxy is registered in order to enable
authentication and authorization via OAuth 2.0 to the web
application. The credentials generated during this step allow
eID-FIWARE IdM to recognize the FIWARE PEP-Proxy as
an authorized instance to validate the access token used by
the web application. The access token obtained during the
user authentication is included in each request of the web
application. In this sense, when the FIWARE PEP-Proxy
receives the request, it validates the access token with the
eID-FIWARE IdM. If the token is valid, the PEP-Proxy
forwards the request to Smart Service Cloud to retrieve the
dataset of the corresponding service.
2) SMARTSANTANDER WEB APPLICATION
It is the visible part of the integration of SmartSantander plat-
form with FIWARE-eIDAS solution. This web application
has been implemented in two parts: frontend and backend.
The frontend is the part of the application with which the
user interacts to access the services of SmartSantander using
a web browser. It has been developed with React JS and
other additional libraries that implement its functionalities,
for instance axios, leaflet, reactstrap, etc.
The backend implements the API that interacts with
both the web page and the security components, FIWARE
PEP-Proxy and eID-FIWARE IdM. The frontend sends the
requests to the backend and the latter, previously processed,
redirects them to the corresponding FIWARE components.
The backend has been implemented with Node JS and
Express JS, and it usesMongoDB to store the necessary infor-
mation to generate the usage statistics of SmartSantander
services. It is worth highlighting that the API does not allow
to store sensitive information of the user, and also implements
routines that prevent from providing such sensitive informa-
tion to the frontend, for example eID number.
3) eIDAS ATTRIBUTES USED
When users authenticate to FIWARE IdM using their national
eID, an IdM profile is created with the user’s personal infor-
mation provided by the eIDAS node corresponding to the eID
of the user. These are the eIDAS attributes, which can be
used by applications and services to customize their function-
alities based on the user profile, obtain more reliable usage
statistics, etc.
One of the main objectives of SmartSantander is to boost
the use of the platform among the scientific community, end
users and service providers in order to reduce technical and
societal barriers that prevent the IoT concept to become an
everyday reality. Taking into account this objective, services
and applications were developed based on more relevant use
cases of the city in order to achieve the greatest scope and
impact on citizenship. For this reason, the services and appli-
cations were not designed with characteristics that enable its
use over specific groups of users.
Although SmartSantander services are not susceptible to
be customized based on the attributes available in eIDAS user
profile, the SmartSantander web application includes three
functionalities that demonstrate its integration with eIDAS:
• Welcome message: Once the user has been authenti-
cated, the eIDAS attribute FirstName is used to display a
welcomemessage with the real name of the user. In addi-
tion, based on the eIDAS attribute PlaceOfBirth a flag
icon corresponding to the user’s country is displayed.
• User activities: The eIDAS attribute PersonIdentifier
is used to track the user activity inside the platform.
As this attribute could not unequivocally identify users,
the unique identifier provided by Keyrock is used
together with it.
• Usage statistics: The eIDAS attributes DateOfBirth and
PlaceOfBirth is used to collect statistical data about the
use of the web application. This information could be
used to build strategies to foster the use of the services.
TABLE 3. Nationality of the users.
D. RESULTS
For validating the deployed pilots we have found a set of users
representing seven European countries. The requirement for
using the services and evaluating the proposal is to own
a valid and up-to-date digital authentication mechanism of
the specific country. Depending on the country the notified
authentication schema can be an electronic card, a digital
certificate or a mobile-based authentication method. Table 3
shows the distribution of citizens between the countries.
Apart from the citizens from these seven countries, we have
provided a testing certificate to seven additional users that
have tested the pilots too.
Before testing the pilots, users had to answer a first ques-
tion about the convenience of having a common identification
point for European citizens. Then they had instructions to
access each service, log in using their eID and explore how
their digital profile is used for the enrichment of the services.
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TABLE 4. Survey answers.
Spanish users directly authenticate in the Spanish eIDAS
node after the redirection from Keyrock. However, other
Member State citizens are redirected to the specific eIDAS
node of their countries by the Spanish one validating the
cross-border authentication mechanism provided by eIDAS.
After the experience, they had to answer three additional
questions asking for their opinion about each service and the
generic integration of the proposed solution in other services.
Table 4 shows the questions of the survey and the answers
provided by the users. As explained before, the first ques-
tion was answered before testing the services and the
answers are clearly positive. Regarding Smartsantander ser-
vice, we observe that users have mostly noticed that the use
of our solution for integrating eIDAS authentication in this
application improves the experience and facilitates the access.
However, in mashme.io service the results are not so good.
This is probably due to the fact that users had to request an
account before start using the service. We conclude that it
is not enough with providing to developers the mechanisms
to integrate eIDAS authentication in their services, it is also
very important the way in which these facilities are finally
integrated in each specific service.
Nevertheless, the global opinion about the initiative is very
positive and almost 90 % of the users would like the inclusion
of this solution in other services and applications in Europe.
It is also relevant that the small part of users that refuse the
idea at the beginning, have now doubts about the convenience
of its massive implementation.
Finally and regarding the amount of users that have vali-
dated the pilots, the hard requirements for using the eIDAS
enabled services nowadays are the main cause of such num-
ber. As stated before, for using the services citizens have to
own a valid and up-to-date digital authentication mechanism
of their country. On the other hand, the eIDAS network
established between Spanish node (where we have connected
the services) and the citizens’ Member State has to be estab-
lished, up and running. However, the most important point to
be addressed is to validate that services can be connected to
the eIDAS infrastructure in an easy and transparent way for
developers. In that sense, the number of countries tested is
rather sufficient and demonstrates that the eIDAS initiative
is being taken seriously by Member States and that citizens
are positive with the idea of having a common identification
schema for accessing public and private services in Europe.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed a model that facilitates the
connection of private and public service providers to the
European eIDAS infrastructure. Themodel allows developers
already using an OAuth 2.0-based delegated authentication
mechanism to offer to their users the possibility of logging in
using their national eID. As explained above, OAuth 2.0 is the
de facto mechanism to delegate authorization in third party
applications and it is currently used by identity managers of
platforms such us Facebook, Twitter or Slideshare.
Consequently, our proposal enhances interoperability of
the eIDAS infrastructure by abstracting the connection of
service providers through a component acting as a gateway
to OAuth 2.0. Thanks to the application-scoped property of
the model, citizens’ privacy is preserved. Furthermore, users
must give explicit consent to share their data when authenti-
cating to each specific service following OAuth 2.0 standard.
The model has been implemented in FIWARE Identity
Manager but it can be also used for enabling the connection
to the eIDAS infrastructure in any other OAuth 2.0 identity
server. This is a very interesting advantage in a moment in
which the European Commission is putting a lot of efforts on
exploiting the use of the eIDAS infrastructure in public and
private services among Europe.
For validating our proposal we have deployed an instance
of the FIWARE implementation of our model and we have
connected two service providers that are publicly available.
MashmeTV provides a videoconferencing tool for e-learning,
consulting and e-health based on WebRTC standard. Thanks
to the proposed integration users can link their Mashme
accounts to their national identity for personalizing the expe-
rience and providing personal and billing information.
On the other hand, Smart Sandander provides access to
the smart city IoT deployment at Santander city in Spain.
This deployment enables services for tourism, traffic control
or parking for citizens. After the integration with eIDAS,
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European users can use their eID for accessing these services
and getting a personalized experience.
Nineteen users from seven different Member States have
tested the deployed services providing us with their impres-
sions about the experience being the received feedback very
positive. After testing the pilots, almost the 90 % of the
citizens think that the inclusion of this initiative in other
public and private services in Europe will definitely facilitate
the access and improve the user experience.
The proposed model could be improved by support-
ing compatibility with other well-known standards such as
OpenID Connect. It is also interesting to study the integration
with clients that support JSON Web Tokens or other authen-
tication standards. This could enhance the proposal in terms
of interoperability. The implementation could also be evolved
in the future by testing it with eIDAS nodes of other Member
States. This is important because the connector part of the
eIDAS nodes is specific for each Member State. Thus, small
adaptation could be needed in each implementation. Having
a single identity manager reference that supports several con-
nection standards and that is compatible with every eIDAS
node implementation is a very interesting future work.
Finally, the implementation of the OAuth 2.0 - eIDAS
model could be extended to support the connection to external
attribute providers. This would add certified sources of users’
personal data such as universities, medical systems or orga-
nizations for the social inclusion of people with disabilities.
So that, services could use these data to provide services
adapted to functional capabilities of users. This could also
ease administrative tasks in public institutions of Member
States.
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